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ABSTRACT
This study examined the institutional settings,
technology selection process, and dissemination strategies
of five agencies that assisted women to adopt and benefit
from improved technology. The findings suggest that
assisting women to adopt improved technology that benefits
them may not be as difficult as the literature implies.
These better-performing women's technology programs assisted
large numbers of women, in part, because 1) the agencies
could use existing networks of women to identify women's
needs and reach many women quickly, 2) the agencies
consulted potential beneficiaries to identify the
constraints women face in their work, and they used those
needs to drive technology selection or development, 3) women
modified their gender roles when necessary, 4) the agencies
matched the technology dissemination strategy with the
physical characteristics of the technology, and 5) where
possible, they selected technology and designed projects so
that poorer women could benefit.
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Title: Professor, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This study would not been possible without the
cooperation of the many agencies consulted, particularly
those that allowed me to visit their projects. I thank the
staff for their time, and their insights. In addition, this
study was originally commissioned by the World Bank
(Population and Human Resources Division, Southern Africa
Desk) and the Ministry of Community Services, Government of
Malawi. I am grateful to Joy de Beyer and Adam Nkunika for
their assistance in carrying out this research.
Professor Judith Tendler provided indispensable advice
and feedback throughout this research process. Professor
Patricia Hynes, my thesis reader, and Jeanne Downing, of
Appropriate Technology International, also read drafts and
shared their useful insights.
In preparing for my research and processing my
findings, I benefitted from many worthwhile discussions with
the women in my thesis group: Judy Boshoven, Julie Chen,
Sumila Guliani, Juliet Johnson, Hnin Hnin Pyne, and
Gabrielle Watson.
Finally, immeasurable thanks also go to those who
provided personal support and encouragement during this
project.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
List of Acronyms .......................................... 5
Introduction............................................... 6
Section 1: Institutional Design.............................16
Section 2: Technology Development and Selection Process... .24
Section 3: Gender Issues ................................... 33
Section 4: Dissemination Strategies ........................ 38
Section 5: Reaching the Poor ............................... 59
Conclusion.................................................. 66
Appendix I: Cases & Photographs ............................. .74
Appendix II: List of Agencies Consulted .................... .82
References...... .......................................... 85
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AHF Africa Housing Fund (Kenya)
ENDA Environment and Development Agency (Zimbabwe)
GTZ German Technical Assistance
NCWD National Council on Women and Development (Ghana)
NGOs Non-governmental organizations
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
TCC Technology Consultancy Center (Ghana)
UNIFEM United Nations Fund for Women
WID Women in Development (literature)
INTRODUCTION
Many efforts to introduce improved technology to poor
women in Africa unfortunately result in broken down,
abandoned machinery rather than in widespread benefits to
women (UNIFEM 1991, Schoonmaker 1988, Date-Bah 1985). The
reasons, ranging from poor technology choice to poorly
managed projects, are by now fairly well known. We know
much less about cases in which large numbers of women
adopted technology and improved their lives as a result.
This study identifies common characteristics of five better-
performing programs in which 600-30,000 women benefitted
from women's ownership and use of improved technology. The
findings in the study indicate ways institutions,
technologies and projects might be selected and designed to
be more effective at helping women benefit from improved
technology.
Background
Women's technology programs are on the current agendas
of African governments, donors, and non-governmental
organizations. Appropriate technology and women's
organizations, for example, promote technology for women as
an alternative to modern, centralized production systems.
According to this view, modern technologies tend to displace
women from their traditional productive activities
(Schumacker 1973, Carr 1985, Dauber & Cain 1988, Stamp
1989). For example, many traditional women's industries in
Africa, such as the processing of oil and beer are
threatened or have already been displaced by large scale,
centralized production of canned cooking fat and bottled
beer. Introducing improved technology to women, then, can be
a strategy for helping women retain their traditional
economic activities. In~ addition, the World Bank has
financed several women's technology programs. In
recognition that structural adjustment programs have hurt
the poor, these women's technology programs try to reduce
poor women's arduous labor burden and/or increase their
income. As an immediate example, the World Bank financed
this study through the Ministry of Community Services of the
Government of Malawi, which is embarking on its third
"technology for women" program in five years.
Most agencies trying to disseminate improved technology
to African women provide equipment and training to women's
groups or cooperatives. Members of the groups benefit from
access to and control of improved technology and, it is
hoped, the viability of the technology will cause other
women to adopt. In practice, however, many of these
programs have had a limited impact. For example, a recently
evaluated program in Mali tried to introduce mechanized de-
hulling machines to rural women for use in millet
processing. Two and a half years into the project, only one
in six of the machines was even operating, despite constant
subsidies from the development agency (Schoonmaker 1988).
In another program in Kenya, an agency donated manual maize
mills to tens of women, who actually preferred to carry
their maize to mechanized mills. In another case, an
assessment of a well known weaving cooperative in Nairobi
revealed that the manager was running the cooperative as a
private business -- the workers did not even know they were
entitled to a share of the profits. Such cases are fairly
common (UNIFEM 1991, D'Onoflores and Pfafflin 1982, Dauber
and Cain 1988, Ahmed 1985).
The problems that typically plague women's technology
programs fit three general categories:
1. Institutional inefficiency: the programs reach few
women, at a high cost, in an untimely manner.
2. Dependency: either because the technology itself is not
viable or because of mismanagement, many women's groups
have to depend on development agencies for continuous
subsidies and repair services. Often, when the
development agency pulls out, the projects collapse.
3. Limited adoption: even successful demonstration
projects often do not result in widespread technology
adoption beyond the project, often because women cannot
adopt without assistance.
Since these problems have been frequently analyzed, this
study focuses on a few success stories.
Cases & Methodology
I selected the five cases in this study because 1) they
benefitted more women, 2) the beneficiaries were not
financially dependent on the development agencies, 3) and/or
the technology was widely adopted by women as a result of
the project. Table 1 summarizes the cases, their locations,
the number of women that benefitted, and the time it took
for the technology to be successfully adopted.
TABLE 1
TECHNOLOGY LOCATION NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES Time
Fuel Kenya, rural 30,000 stoves, 4
Efficient individually owned yrs
Stoves
Housing & Kenya, rural 900 women in one 2
Water project, 4 factories yrs
Tanks
Mechanized Zimbabwe, 600-900: 3 mills, owned 2
maize mill rural by 5-10 women each, used yrs
trading by 200-300 women each.
centers
Palm Oil Ghana, rural 2,500: 50 factories, 4
Processing trading owned by 15-30 women, yrs
centers. used by 30 additional
women each.
Improved Ghana, 845-1950: 200-300 women 2
Fish Ovens fishing owners in Choker, 15-30 yrs
villages women owners in three
other fishing-villages,
and 645-1650 employees.
In each case, a local agency implemented the program
with foreign donor funding, but these agencies did not work
alone. Rather, they benefitted from cooperation or prior
work of agencies that organized women at the grass roots
level and of technical institutes or companies that
developed the technologies. Table 2 lists the donor, the
implementing agency, the agency that organized women, and
the technology developer in each case.
TABLE 2
TECH- DONOR IMPLEMENTING WOMEN'S TECHNOLOGY
NOLOGY AGENCY ORGANIZER DEVELOPER
Fuel GTZ, Ministry of Maendeleo GTZ &
Ef- German Energy (with ya Maendeleo ya
ficient Govern- Ministry of Wanawake, Wanawake
Stoves ment Agriculture Ministry
and others) of Culture -
and Social
Services
Water CIDA, Africa Ministry Intermediate
Tanks & Ford Housing of Culture Technology
Housing Founda- Fund, and Social Workshop, UK
tion Shelter Services
Afrique, OAU
Maize UNIFEM Environment Ministry Private
Mills & of Sector
Development Community
Agency Services
(ENDA)
Palm ILO Nat'l NCWD Technology
Oil Council on Consultancy
Women and Center, USE,
Development Ghana
(NCWD)
Fish ILO NCWD NCWD Kagan
Ovens Institute,
I __ Ghana
I began this study by interviewing staff in several
technology development agencies based in the US' in order
to identify important issues and successful programs. I
then visited 11 reputedly successful programs in Kenya,
Nigeria, Ghana, and Zimbabwe, later selecting the five more
established programs to analyze here. I visited each
country for two to four weeks, and interviewed (1) high
level staff in the implementing agencies, (2) field staff
that work directly with the women and, (3) in most cases, a
few women's groups that the field staff selected. I had
some access to evaluation reports, but most of the
information contained in this study comes directly from my
interviews with agency and field staff. When visiting each
country, I also consulted other agencies working on women
and technology projects. These interviews were important in
confirming some interpretations and bringing others into
question. In addition, over the last three years, I have
consulted for several community development and appropriate
technology organizations in East Africa and have had the
opportunity to observe other women's technology projects to
which I refer for comparison.
This paper organized the findings around five issues
that development agencies and the literature focus on to
explain the problems women face in adopting improved
technology, and to propose solutions. With many of these
See List of Agencies Consulted.
issues, the current thinking tends to look for broad,
categorical reasons for program failure. The cases in this
study suggest different ways of thinking about these issues
and reveal several simple and pragmatic ways the better-
performing agencies were able to help larger numbers of
women adopt and benefit from improved technology.
Issues
1) Institutional Design: Current thinking on the
institutional design of women's technology programs focuses
on whether government agencies or non-government
organizations, whether women's organizations or mainstream
development agencies, can more effectively reach women with
improved technology. Surprisingly, however, the agencies in
this study represented all four types of institutions.
Section 1, then, examines the common ways these different
types of agencies were able to reach large numbers of women
in a timely manner.
2) Technology Development & Selection: One commonly
cited explanation for the limited impact of many women's
technology programs is that the technology itself is
inappropriate, according to this view, because technology is
often developed in "isolated" technical institutes. The
literature on technology development counsels agencies to
avoid this problem by developing technology with input from
potential users. In practice, though, technology developers
find this process arduous. In addition, in the cases
studied, some designers used both non-interactive design
processes. This means that interactive design processes are
not necessarily crucial to appropriate technology for women.
Section 2 looks into the technology development and
selection processes used by the agencies in this study, and
identifies other key factors that also contributed to
identifying appropriate technology for women.
3) Gender Issues: The Women in Development (WID)
literature and many development professionals dispute
women's ability to change their culturally defined gender
roles. A few authors (Ventura-Dias 1985, Stamp 1989)
advocate women openly challenging gender roles by taking up
men's work, but most current thinking argues that women will
not adopt technology associated with men's work. Since most
improved technologies in Africa are perceived as something
for men, this view presents dim prospects for women adopting
improved technology at all. Most of the technologies in
this study, however, led to women performing some of these
male-specific tasks. How, then, did these women manage to
adopt the technology ? Section- 3 illustrates what types of
men's work these technologies required, and how women were
able to step out of their gender roles to adopt the
technology.
4) Dissemination Strategies: Development agencies and
the literature on women and technology deliberate
extensively on what technology dissemination strategies work
well for women. 2 Dissemination strategies currently used
generally fall into the categories of "extension" and
"market" approaches (Carr, 1989). In "extension-style"
programs, agencies reach women by providing technology
directly to selected women's groups, but in many cases
women's groups are poorly managed and often rely on
development agencies for constant subsidies. -In the
"market-style" programs, agencies have been more successful
at widely disseminating technology because they promote the
technology broadly and train private-sector machine
manufacturers, who then sell equipment to large numbers of
buyers. Though these individuals tend to manage the improved
technology better than women's groups, they are usually
middle-income men, who have more capital, mobility and
access to information than rural women (Carr 1989, McVay and
Fisher 1989). Both approaches, then, have so far been
limited in their ability to get technology out to large
numbers of women.
The better-performing agencies in this study used two
different strategies that each included elements of both the
"extension" and "market" approach. Section 4.1 examines
three cases in which women's groups adopted the technology
These titles are somewhat misleading. See Section 4.
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without remaining dependent on the development agency.
Section 4.2 looks at the other two cases in which the
technology was widely adopted by individual women. Neither
strategy was consistently more successful than the other.
Rather, the physical characteristics of the particular
technologies determined which dissemination strategies
worked better.
5) Reaching The Poor: Most of the literature on women
and technology maintains that improved technology is
inherently detrimental to the poor, mainly because it
displaces paid labor (Ahmed 1985, Dauber and Cain 1988,
D'Onoflores and Pflafflin 1988). The approach most
development agencies take to avoid this process, in the case
of women, is to donate equipment to groups of poor women.
The cases in this study raise questions about this analysis
of the distributional impact of improved technology. Four
of the technologies did not displace women's paid labor, and
the women in the groups that benefitted from these programs
were better-off women, not the poor. Section 5, then, looks
at other aspects of these programs that affected the
distributional impact of the technologies.
SECTION ONE: THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
One reason for the limited impact of many women's
technology programs is that the implementing agencies are
ineffective at organizing and working with women or at
developing, assessing, and disseminating technology. In
trying to explain this ineffectiveness, many planners in
this field criticize the type of institution that
implemented the program, whether government agencies or
NGOs, women's organizations or mainstream technical
agencies. The implementing agencies studies here, however,
had two other characteristics in common: 1) instead of
trying to organize women themselves, they benefitted from
existing networks of women; the latter helped the agencies
to identify women's need for technology and to target large
numbers of women; and 2) they had successfully developed a
business orientation and technical capacity. The type of
implementing agency was, thus, not a major factor in the
success of these programs.
1.1 Governments or NGOs
Government agencies and NGOs have different strengths
and weaknesses in their ability to reach women with improved
technology. Government agencies can reach larger numbers of
people because they are larger, are more permanent, and have
more resources. NGOs, in contrast, are significantly
smaller, often operate in limited geographic areas, and tend
to reach fewer people. At the same time, many writers see
NGOs as more responsive to the needs of particular client
groups, (James 1987, Lipsky and Smith 1989) such as women.
TABLE 3
TECHNOLOGY IMPLEMENTING AGENCY DESCRIPTION
Fuel Ministry of Energy, Government Agency
Efficient Government of Kenya, with
Stoves Ministry of Agriculture.
Water Africa Housing Fund, a Multilateral
Tanks & part of Shelter Afrique, Government Agency
Housing the housing program of with offices in
the OAU. Nairobi, Kenya.
Maize Environment and International NGO
Mills: Development Agency with offices in
Zimbabwe (ENDA). Harare, Zimbabwe
Palm Oil & National Council on Women Government
Fish Ovens and Development (NCWD) advisory board on
women's affairs.
In these cases, however, both government agencies and
NGOs reached significant numbers of women (See Table 3). A
government agency in Kenya (the Ministry of Energy)
disseminated the fuel efficient stoves. An international
NGO with offices in Zimbabwe (Environment and Development
Agency, ENDA) disseminated the maize mills. The other two
agencies were nether typical government agencies nor NGOs.
One is a government advisory board that also organizes and
trains women's groups, the National Council on Women and
Development (NCWD), which disseminated both the improved
fish ovens and the palm-oil processing equipment. The other
is a semi-autonomous program within a multilateral
government organization -- the Africa Housing Fund (AHF) of
Shelter Afrique, part of the Organization of African Unity.
All kinds of agencies, in short, turned out to be able to
reach women with improved technology.
1.2 Women's Organizations or Mainstream Agencies
A parallel concern focuses on the limitations of both
women's organizations and mainstream development agencies.
For mainstream development agencies working with both men
and women, such as government ministries and appropriate
technology organizations, women are often a low priority,
and these agencies therefore do not effectively reach women.
For example, the mainstream agencies sometimes take funding
that was set aside for women and use it for higher priority
projects that target men (Buvinic 1989). Even when
mainstream agencies have the will to work with women, they
sometimes have limited links to rural women and limited
capacity to establish such links. This problem has led
donors to fund national women's organizations to implement
women's technology programs in Africa. They work exclusively
with women and have built up extensive contacts with large
numbers of women due to their considerable organizing
efforts.
Depending on the particular women's organization, the
latter approach also has had limitations (Buvinic 1989,
Overholt 1985, Ventura-Dias 1985, UNIFEM 1991, Stamp 1989).
Many women's organizations have a historical "welfare" focus
on home economics, health, and family planning issues. They
therefore lack the economic orientation to implement
programs that increase women's productivity, which is the
focus of women's technology programs. Other women's
organizations do not represent the "true" interests of women
because they are founded primarily for political purposes or
are co-opted by political parties. The criticisms of both
women's organizations and mainstream agencies bring out the
importance of an agency having technical capacity, on the
one hand, and the will and capacity to work with women, on
the other. They nevertheless leave the impression that
neither type of institution is capable of reaching women
with improved technology.
In the cases in this study, however, both mainstream
agencies and women's organizations implemented the better-
performing programs. As with the debate over government
agencies and NGOs, whether the agencies in this study were
women's organizations or mainstream agencies does not
account for their success. One agency, which disseminated
both the improved palm-oil equipment and improved fish ovens
in Ghana, was a women's organization, the NCWD. The other
three, however were mainstream development agencies: the
Ministry of Energy and Shelter Afrique in Kenya, and ENDA in
Zimbabwe.
1.3 Benefitting from Women's Networks
The implementing agencies in this study, in contrast to
the typical cases, had a broad impact, were responsive to
women's needs, reached large numbers of women, and
implemented economically and technically viable projects.
They were able to do these things by 1) relying on existing
networks of women to identify widespread needs for
technology and to reach large numbers quickly, and 2) by
developing a strong technical capacity and development
orientation.
In trying to gather information about women's needs and
at the same time reach large numbers of women, staff of the
programs in this study took advantage of extensive, prior
organizing efforts often carried out by other development
agencies. Since the late 1970s, in each of the countries in
this study, governments have called for rural women to form
and register groups of 15 to 30 women in order to gain
access to development assistance. As a result, development
agencies, different government ministries, and national
women's organizations had assisted women to form such groups
by providing organization and leadership training. This
organizing process occurred prior to and unrelated to the
implementation of the women's technology programs. In
Kenya, the Ministry of Community Services trained and
registered the women's groups that participated in the
Africa Housing Fund Project. Both that Ministry and
Maendeleo Ya Wanawake, the national women's organization,
helped identify women who participated in the fuel-efficient
stove program. In Ghana, the NCWD kept track of and
provided training to the women's groups that benefitted from
their technology program. In Zimbabwe, the Ministry of
Community Services registered and trained the women's groups
that benefitted from the maize mill programs. The women's
networks were essential because they were the only way the
agencies in this study could contact large numbers of rural
women. Women in rural areas of Kenya, Ghana and Zimbabwe
have limited access to television, radio or newspaper
communication, and in many cases agricultural extension
agents contact men more than women.
How, precisely, did the women's networks assist the
implementing agencies in this study ? Initially, the
implementing agencies conducted surveys of the women's
groups to identify widespread needs for improved technology.
The agencies later contacted field staff in the agencies
described above to inform large numbers of women of the
program's potential benefits. These field staff then
assisted women's groups to apply to participate in the
improved technology programs. With a large pool of
applicants, the implementing agencies selected the most
experienced and appropriately located groups to carry out
demonstration projects. This process easily linked the
implementing agencies with large numbers of women whose
needs the agencies could then identify and respond to.
Unlike many "top down" government agencies, the better
performing agencies solicited women's input in designing the
program. Unlike many NGOs with limited outreach, these
agencies could easily survey and communicate with large
numbers of women. In contrast to many mainstream agencies
that work more easily with men, these agencies successfully
targeted women.
At the same time, critics of many national women's
organizations and women's groups organized by development
agencies describe them as being "sold out," highly
politicized, or otherwise not being truly representative of
women's needs (Stamp 1989, Sorensen 1990). This makes the
above represented positive finding surprising. Some of the
women's networks used by the better performing agencies in
this study may indeed have functioned as such patron-client
systems that cater primarily to political agendas.
Maendeleo ya Wanawake, which is now a wing of the only
political party in Kenya, is infamous for these
characteristics (Stamp 1989, Sorensen 1990). Their positive
contribution to the better-performing programs - that is,
providing a point of contact between rural women and the
implementing agencies - requires some explanation.
Perhaps the implementing agencies were able to keep
many of the political tendencies of the women's
organizations and networks at bay because the agencies had
developed a technical staff. ENDA in Zimbabwe, AHF, and
the Ministry of Energy in Kenya are all mainstream agencies
that had both the technical skills and the development
orientation to disseminate technology in a technically and
financially viable way. In Ghana, the ILO provided
extensive training to existing staff and funds for
additional staff to the NCWD to develop its technical and
financial capacity. This technical and business orientation
balanced the political leanings of the women's networks.
For example, if an influential person pressured the
implementing agency to supply equipment to a particular
women's group, the implementing agency often refused if the
proposed site was not suitable. Other particular mechanisms
the agencies had for ensuring financially viable projects
will be discussed in more detail in Section 4. For now, the
main point is that these networks of women served as
invaluable communication channels between women and the
women's technology programs. And, the determined
intervention of technically competent implementing agencies
tempered the political tendencies of the women's networks.
SECTION TWO: TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND SELECTION PROCESSES
One common critique of improved technology programs,
for both men and women, is that technology developed by
professionals in "isolated" technical institutes is often
not economically viable or is otherwise "inappropriate."
Many concerned planners see this problem as worse for women
because most engineers are men and because most machines are
not designed with women in mind as owners and operators
(Carr 1985, Ewusi 1987, Date-Bah 1985). For example, manual
mills for home use may seem affordable, given average
household income, but may not be affordable for women given
that they control a smaller portion of household income.
According to this view, an "interactive" technology
development process between designers and potential women
users produces technology that better fits women's
constraints and their gender roles (Carr 1985, Ewusi 1987,
Date-Bah 1985). For example, the successfully disseminated
fuel-efficient stoves in Kenya represent only a marginal
change in the way women normally cook, and they cost the
equivalent of only two days' rural wages. In this case, two
female designers lived in rural villages and developed the
stoves with rural women, incorporating the way they cook and
their strategies for saving wood with components of stoves
used in other countries.
Though few technology developers would dispute the
usefulness of this interactive approach, in practice, many
find it time-consuming and burdensome. It is difficult for
educated, often foreign and male engineers to communicate
well with rural African women. In addition, many designers
feel that designing technology for one particular context
limits its applicability in other situations. As a result,
interactive processes are rarely used.
In the cases of this study, how was the technology
developed ? Only the development of the fuel efficient
stove fits the ideal "interactive" design process, which
fully engages rural women. (See Table 4) Two cases were
mixed. With the improved palm-oil processing equipment and
the improved fish ovens, male Ghanian engineers at local
technology development institutes designed the improved
technology, on the one hand but, surprisingly, they used an
"interactive" approach, on the other. Though they did not
live in rural villages for extended periods, they had women
in mind as the ultimate users, they observed women at work,
designed the technology as an improvement on women's
processes, and then field tested it with them. These two
cases contradict the stereotype of the "isolated" technical
institute that refuses to design technology for women.
Even more surprising, given the importance attributed
to the interactive process, are the two final cases in which
the technology designers did not even have women in mind as
the ultimate users. In the case of the building-materials
equipment in Kenya, a British agency (Intermediate
Technology Workshops) designed the machines in the UK. The
few field tests took place with elite building engineers at
the University of Nairobi in Kenya. With the maize mills in
Zimbabwe, a large scale private-sector manufacturer copied
the machines from imports, also without thinking about rural
women as potential operators. Both of these technologies
have nevertheless benefitted significant numbers of women.
These two cases contradict the prevailing wisdom that
technology developed without input from women does not
benefit women.
TABLE 4
TECHNOLOGY SOURCE PROCESS
Fuel German and Kenyan technical interactive
Efficient experts in Maendeleo ya
Stoves Wanawake, a national women's
organization.
Low-cost Intermediate Technology not
Water Tanks Workshops, an NGO in the UK, interactive
& Houses now profit making Parry Assoc.
Mechanized Large scale private sector not
Maize Mill manufacturers copied imports. interactive
Palm Oil Technology Consultancy Center, partly
Processing Kumasi, Ghana interactive
Improved Kagan Technical Institute partly
Fish Ovens interactive
Identifying technology that is "appropriate" for women,
then, may be easier than the current thinking suggests. The
agencies studied here were able to select appropriate
technology for women, for the most part, without engaging in
burdensome, "interactive" research and development
themselves. Rather, they 1) consulted potential women
beneficiaries in identifying women's need for technology,
and 2) where possible, selected existing technology.
1) Identifying Women's Need For Technology
To identify women's need for technology, the agencies
in this study first chose a sector, and then consulted women
to identify constraints within that sector. In Kenya, the
Africa Housing Fund (AHF) focused broadly on the shelter
"sector" - housing, water, and sanitation - because
providing shelter is their mandate. The AHF staff then
consulted women's groups in Eastern Kenya, which identified
water as their primary concern in that sector. In response,
AHF narrowed the focus of that project to providing
household rain catchment, which supplies cleaner water and
reduces the time and energy women have to spend collecting
water.
The Women and Energy Project in German Technical
Assistance (GTZ), the donor for the fuel-efficient stove
program in Kenya, has a mandate to assist women in the
energy sector. By living in rural villages and surveying
women's groups with Maendeleo ya Wanawake staff, GTZ staff
examined the energy needs of average rural women and saw
that the vast majority of Kenyan women cook on three-stone
fires, burning wood that is becoming increasingly scarce.
GTZ therefore chose to assist women with a more efficient
stove that would reduce their wood consumption and thereby
save women's time and labor.
In Ghana, the NCWD conducted a national survey of
women's groups to identify sectors women worked in, and the
problems they face. Large numbers of women identified palm-
oil processing as their major source of income. Though the
oil extraction rates the women obtained using traditional
methods were high enough to earn a profit, the women could
not process all the palm nuts grown in their area because
the traditional methods were so slow. As a result, they
were missing an economic opportunity to increase production
and, therefore, their income. In addition, in some areas,
the (male) palm-nut growers were starting to process oil
themselves, using improved equipment. This posed a threat
to the traditional women processors, because the improved
equipment produces oil more cheaply than the traditional
method. The NCWD therefore identified palm-oil processing
as a priority sector, and the slow speed of traditional
processing methods as a major obstacle to the growth of
women's businesses in that sector.
In the NCWD survey, women also identified fish smoking
as a major economic activity in coastal areas. Women fish
smokers were having trouble taking advantage of the
increasing demand for fish that came from rapidly growing
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cities and towns and from the increased use of fish as a
component in animal feed. Women were working longer hours
during the fish-smoking season and neglecting some of their
household duties, such as cooking regular meals. The NCWD
thus chose to assist women with fish smoking and to address
the major problems women were facing - the low capacity of
the ovens and the extensive labor required to smoke fish.
Finally, UNIFEM, the donor for the ENDA Maize Mill
program in Zimbabwe, chose to launch an international
program focusing on the "food cycle" because women are the
major food producers in Africa. With ENDA staff, they
surveyed Zimbabwean women to identify limitations women
faced in food production. Among other difficulties, the
women named the hard labor of grinding maize with a mortar
and pestle or long walks to the few mechanized mills that
existed in the area. UNIFEM and ENDA then decided to assist
women with improved maize milling technology.
The approaches illustrated above differ from most
technology programs, which typically choose a particular
technology and then focus on disseminating it, only to find
out later that it was "inappropriate" for women, or did not
meet a priority need. They are similar, though, to an
effective strategy used by Oxfam in its women's program in
India and Bangladesh. In that program, Oxfam assisted large
numbers of women by identifying the sectors they are already
working in, organizing women and identifying their common
needs (Chen, 1986). Though that program did not focus
specifically on improved technology, this type of "sub-
sector" approach is also used by at least two agencies that
disseminate technology, Technoserve and Appropriate
Technology International. By examining the sectors and
identifying specific difficulties that large number of women
share, this approach avoids the typical problem of
disseminating technology that women do not really need.
2) Technology Selection
In four cases - palm-oil processing, fish smoking,
housing and water tank building, and maize milling - the
agencies selected technology that was already available,
rather than developing it from scratch. As a result, the
task the agencies faced was easier and narrowed - namely
assisting women to obtain equipment and training them to use
it. AHF in Kenya found and purchased a full "kit" of
equipment to manufacture low-cost building materials for
houses and water tanks. The "kit" and training were
available from a private dealer in Nairobi. AHF then hired,
in their Nairobi office, an expert in that technology who
formerly worked with the dealer. He trained other AHF staff
in the new technology and AHF quickly became one of the
regional experts in that type of low-cost building, again,
without having to do any research and development.
In Ghana, the NCWD identified improved palm-oil
processing equipment developed by a local technical
institute, TCC. The improved equipment increased the amount
of palm nuts women could process in a given time. The NCWD
purchased palm-oil processing equipment from a manufacturer
in central Ghana trained by TCC and they hired experts from
TCC to train their staff in machine installation,
maintenance and repair. In the case of the fish ovens, the
NCWD hired the technology developers from another technical
institute, Kagan Institute, to train village manufacturers
and NCWD staff on how to make, use and repair the fish
ovens. In both of these cases, the task was significantly
reduced because the NCWD took advantage of prior research
and development carried out by the technical institutes.'
Finally, when ENDA decided to assist women with maize
milling, they decided to disseminate mechanized maize mills,
in part, because they were available. The mechanized mills
were already being manufactured in Harare and were used
throughout Zimbabwe. In addition, ENDA staff had expertise
in maize mill installation, maintenance and repair. Again,
ENDA selecting an existing technology was easier than
designing a new one.
This study did not allow for an investigation of what
enabled these institutes to successfully make the
technologies readily available, although this part of the
story is obviously important to the overall success of
the women's technology programs.
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There was one exception: the fuel-efficient stoves. In
this case a technology was not available on the market in
Kenya. GTZ (the donor) therefore sponsored a three-year
research and development project before launching the
national dissemination program that this study focuses on.
This shows that there is sometimes a trade off between
running an efficient program by selecting existing
technology and meeting some priority needs that existing
technology does not address. In this case, the investment
in developing the stove had a high payoff: 30,000 women now
use the stove and more women continue to adopt it. The
other four cases nevertheless indicate that women's
technology programs do not have to develop their own
technology in order to benefit many women.
SECTION THREE: GENDER ROLES AND IMPROVED TECHNOLOGY
The third issue surrounding women's technology programs
focuses on their ability to adopt particular technologies
that go against their culturally-defined gender roles. one
"WID" position advocates that women take up men's work, even
carpentry and metalwork, because wages are higher and
because.it is felt that women can best achieve equality with
men by playing as important a role as they do in production
(Ventura-Dias 1985, Stamp 1989). Some African authors
characterize that view as a Western feminist perspective
imposed on African women (Ewusi 1987, Date-Bah 1985, Stamp
1989). These and other writers argue that, in practice,
women will not adopt technology in male-dominated sectors
nor will they adopt technology that requires performing
tasks ordinarily considered men's work (Overholt 1985,
Tinker 1985, Carr 1985, Ahmed 1985). Many improved
technologies -- from growing cash crops to using animal-
drawn plows and carts, to operating any mechanized equipment
-- are associated with "men's work" in Africa. Sometimes
this is due to extension workers having originally
introduced them to men, not women (Boserup 1972), and
sometimes it is due to long-standing cultural traditions
(Ewusi 1987, Date-Bah 1985). Either way, the literature
sees the gender roles associated with improved technology as
major barriers to women adopting.
In contrast to these views, this research suggests that
women's culturally-defined gender roles may be less of a
barrier to women adopting technology than has been implied,
for two reasons. 1) The technologies reviewed here cannot
be easily categorized as "male" or "female," as fitting or
challenging existing gender roles. 2) Women adopted the
improved technologies even when the technologies clearly
involved men's work.
3.1 Defining Gender Roles
The five technologies that women in this study adopted
did not require women to enter male-dominated sectors, but
in most cases women had to perform some tasks that are
ordinarily considered "men's" work. The activities improved
by the technologies selected were all in sectors that women
are active in: cooking, collecting water, palm-oil
processing, fish smoking and maize grinding. In four cases,
however, the technology did involve jobs considered to be
men's work, specifically: operating mechanized equipment,
performing full-time wage labor, keeping accounts, and
managing complex businesses.
For example, the improved palm-oil processing
equipment, the building-materials equipment and the maize
mills were all mechanized. In addition, these machines are
much larger scale than women's individual production
methods. operating and managing the equipment required
full-time work at small factories, the keeping of written
records of the financial transactions, and a manager to take
charge of the enterprise on behalf of the group. In the
areas where these projects took place, these sorts of tasks
were normally done by men, even though men were not
responsible for processing palm oil, milling maize or
collecting water. The fuel efficient stove, used by women
to cook meals, could not have been considered a "men's"
technology, but commercial production of the clay stove
liners required men's work. The liners were made in small
factories with full-time wage workers and relatively complex
management systems. In four cases, then, the improved
technologies could not easily be categorized as either
fitting or challenging women's culturally defined gender
roles. It would be difficult to predict, therefore, whether
women would or would not adopt these technologies based
solely on how they fit local culture surrounding gender.
3.2 Changing Gender Roles
When women adopted the technologies, even though they
required men's work, they transcended the limited of their
gender roles. This occurred in four ways.
1) Training: One reason women often have trouble
performing men's work is that they do not have the technical
skills. Though many rural men also have limited technical
expertise, the problem is more acute for women because they
have less education, less leadership experience, and less
exposure to complex machinery and equipment. The agencies
in this study provided technical and managerial training
specifically designed for illiterate women. The training
sessions usually lasted one to two weeks, and the agencies
also provided follow-up advice once the businesses got
started.
2) Simplifying the business structure: Sometimes the
women and/or the agency structured the project to simplify
the management of the new technology. Many typical projects
require women to operate equipment as a cooperative, but
cooperatives are difficult to manage. For example, if women
produced palm oil cooperatively, they would have had to keep
a large inventory of palm nuts, risking that the nuts would
sit for too long and get spoiled. They would have had to
identify bottle suppliers, transporters and large enough
markets for their oil production. In selling processing
services to individual producers, in contrast, the women's
groups only had to collect fees and hire a few workers to
operate the machines. This "fee for service" arrangement
was much simpler.
3) Facing and challenging stereotypes: When faced with
social barriers to doing men's work -- such as hostility,
resentment, and ridicule from people in their community --
some women were willing to openly challenge local gender
stereotypes. For example, of 900 women involved in the AHF
project, only 45 women were willing to work in the building-
materials factory. They didn't care, they said, if people
laughed at them. One factory worker said, "Now we are
laughing because we are getting money and we are getting
houses."
4) Hiring men: When-women did not want to perform men's
work, they simply hired men to run the machines or keep the
account books, which changed both male and female gender
roles, because men do not ordinaries work for women. This
was most common with the diesel-powered maize mills and
palm-nut "digesters." Diesel engines are difficult run, so
women hired skilled (male) technicians to run the machines.
Since men rarely work for rural women, hiring and
supervising male workers was a significant gender change,
for both men and women.
This experience contradicts the prevailing view that
women will not adopt technology that requires men's work.
It does not necessarily support the claim that women should
or can easily enter male-dominated sectors. Rather, it
confirms assertions in some feminist literature that, gender
divisions of labor are culturally defined and in flux within
cultures over time. Women often change their gender roles
and perform "men's" work when there are overriding rewards
or incentives (Stamp 1989).
SECTION FOUR: DISSEMINATION STRATEGIES
This section focuses on a effective dissemination
strategies for getting technology to women. Most
development agencies use an approach often referred to as
the "public sector" or "extension" route, confusing titles
because both NGOs and government agencies use the
strategy.' Agencies using this approach launch
demonstration projects in which they donate equipment and
provide training to women's groups. The agencies then hope
that other women will adopt the technology used in these
demonstration projects. Other agencies use a so-called
"private sector" or "market" approach. They work primarily
with small machine manufacturing firms, teaching them to
make the improved equipment and sell it on the open market.
This title is also a misnomer since agencies using the
"market" strategy nonetheless engage in research and
development, extension work with machine manufacturers, and
often advertising campaigns as well. These are, however,
the terms the agencies themselves use, and, in practice, the
two strategies have very different impacts and problems
(Carr 1989).
The "extension" approach targets women, but it often
does not achieve sustainable or widespread technology
adoption. Many women's groups that receive equipment in
I will refer to this subsequently as "extension, " even
though the contrasting "market" approach also involves
extension work.
these programs fail manage it sustainably: the groups are
mismanaged, they do not maintain the machines, or they
suffer losses. The groups then depend on the development
agency for subsidies to keep the equipment operating. Such
dependent projects hamper agencies from starting more
demonstration projects and reaching larger numbers of women.
In addition, few women outside the demonstration projects
are convinced that the technology would be feasible without
the assistance of the agency (Carr 1985, Schoonmaker 1988).
The "market" approach has so far more successfully
achieved widespread adoption but is criticized for not
reaching women (Carr 1989, McVay and Fisher 1989, Dauber &
Cain 1988, Ahmed 1985). Agencies using a "market" approach
start by identifying a technology, which they feel addresses
a broad need and is financially viable in a country. They
then train manufacturers to make the implements. The
agencies promote the technology widely, often only becoming
aware of who the beneficiary groups will be when they
purchase the implements from the manufacturers.
Sometimes the characteristics of the ultimate
beneficiary groups surprise the agencies. For example, NGO
promoters of fibre-concrete roofing tiles in Kenya set out
to assist in the provision of low-cost housing. Though the
agency has been pleased that hundreds of people purchased
the machines and independently established small businesses,
they were surprised to find that most of these investors
were middle income men. In addition, these entrepreneurs
established their factories in wealthy neighborhoods and
selling to people who would otherwise have bought more
expensive clay tiles, not to poor people who would otherwise
have bought corrugated iron sheets (McVay and Fisher 1989).
In another example, promoters of ox-carts that set out to
relieve women of their heavy transport burden in collecting
water and fuel, are often surprised to find that middle
income, male farmers purchase most carts. In addition, these
farmers often use the cart for commercial activities rather
than for women's tasks. (Dawson and Smith 1990, Doran 1989,
Gaidzanwa 1990).
As in these cases, the "market" approach tends to
achieve wider, technology adoption because 1) individuals
tend to manage and maintain the equipment better than
groups, and 2) individuals continue to purchase the
machinery directly from the manufacturers, even after the
agency's intervention ends. According to most literature
and many professionals in the field, the investors who
benefit from this approach tend to be mainly middle-income
men. Due to the seeming inability of the "market" approach
to reach women, most women's technology programs still use
the "extension" approach, in spite of its limited
performance in establishing viable group projects and
facilitating widespread technology adoption.
This discussion leaves the impression that reaching
large numbers of women with improved technology is not
possible. But, the better-performing agencies in this study
were able to do so. Why ? The agencies combined elements
of the "extension" and "market" programs in two different
ways. 1) In three cases, palm-oil processing, maize
milling, and the building of house and water tanks, the
agencies explicitly choose to assist women's groups to adopt
the technology. And, these groups managed their affairs
independently, in contrast to many typical women's groups,
without continuous support from the agencies. 2) In two
other cases, the fuel-efficient stoves and the improved fish
ovens, the technology was widely adopted by individuals
beyond the demonstration projects. And, these individuals
were women, not'men. The rest -f this section examines
these two strategies in detail to identify how they worked
in ways that neither the "extension" nor the "market"
approaches, working alone, have.
4.1 Technology Adoption by Women's Groups
In three of the five cases reviewed, the agencies used
a dissemination approach that resulted in women's groups
owning, operating, and maintaining the improved equipment
themselves, after the project ended (the AHF project, the
palm-oil processing and the maize milling). Not only do
these groups cover the cost of operating the improved
equipment, but many even turn a profit. Factors
contributing to this success were 1) the agencies' carrying
out feasibility studies before project implementation, 2)
the fact that the agencies and the women's groups were
subjected to performance pressures, and 3) mechanisms
internal to the women's groups.
4.11 Feasibility Studies
First, in contrast to normal practice of providing
projects to women in a particular area or to the most
politically connected women's groups, the agencies in this
study carried out micro-level feasibility studies as a basis
for selecting good locations and capable beneficiary groups
for their demonstration projects. The viability of a
location was based on market surveys to assess the supply of
inputs, the available market, the price women will pay for
user fees and, as a result, the projected financial
viability of the technology at that site. The agencies
selected women's groups that have had successful past
endeavors, as shown by group savings and case histories of
groups' activities. In the NCWD program in Ghana, for
example, a staff person spent two weeks at a proposed
project site to carry out a market survey, get a history of
the group, and gain a sense of the local politics and group
leadership. The agencies used these studies and case
histories to weed out locations where the technology would
not be financially viable and to exclude inexperienced
groups which did not have the organizational or financial
capacity to manage the new business. The NCWD rejected
around 20% of the applications for assistance, and the
UNIFEM program in Zimbabwe only assisted three of ten groups
that wanted maize mills. Needless to say, this initial
selection process increased the chances of supporting
financially viable projects.
This system of selecting the groups and locations may
sound like a reasonable way of selecting viable projects,
but many agencies resist it for two reasons. 1) Many
development agencies do not have a large pool of locations
and potential beneficiaries. For example, many community
development agencies organize and assist women's groups in a
geographically limited area. Often the agencies work with
these groups because they represent the poorest women, which
makes it difficult to "weed out" undesirable beneficiaries
or locations.
2) In many agencies, program benefits are rewarded on
the basis of patronage, rather than project viability.
Women's groups often connect to development programs through
local patrons (chiefs, politicians, leaders in women's
organizations, or other wealthy community members) who
recommend their favorite groups to the program in return
either for political support in the party or women's
organization or for positions in the project itself. When
equipment is distributed in this politically motivated way,
without regard to its financial viability or to the group's
capacity to manage it, the likelihood of project failure is
obviously high. Eliminating patronage is probably
impossible and may be counter-productive, since local
patrons often offer constructive support to the women's ,
groups. The feasibility studies used by the agencies in
this study did limit the negative influence of patronage on
project location and beneficiary selection.
The ability of the agencies to carry out 'and
successfully use feasibility studies depended, in part, on
the development perspective and technical capacity of the
implementing agencies, as described in Section 1. The
agencies had a business orientation, rather than a welfare
perspective, and they had the technical capacity to carry
out good assessments. In turn, the agencies' confidence in
the groups' abilities and the viability of the location
resulted in their subjecting the groups to pressures to
perform.
4.12 Performance Pressures
1) No donations: A second strategy these programs used
to enhance the financial viability of the group projects was
to avoid donating equipment and insist that beneficiaries
pay for it. Sometimes, despite field tests of improved
technology, many less successful agencies still donate
irrelevant equipment to women who surprise agencies by not
using it. For example, in Kenya, a development agency
donated manual maize mills to women, but the women preferred
carrying their maize to the market and paying for mechanized
milling services there. The women rarely used the manual
mills because they were not a significant improvement over
what they had been doing. This is a common occurrence
because many development agencies focus on the immediate
goal of distributing large numbers of improved machines, and
they only evaluate actual use later, if at all.
Because the agencies studies did not donate equipment,
they faced the following kind of pressure to provide viable
technology. The beneficiaries had to pay, in various forms.
As an initial investment, the NCWD, AHF and ENDA require the
groups themselves to build the buildings that house the palm
oil presses, building-materials equipment and maize mills.
In addition, the groups need to have a specific amount in
their savings account to cover working capital. Only then
do the agencies loan the groups the money to buy the
equipment, which is then used as collateral for the loan. 5
According to program staff, this level of commitment from
the women's groups encouraged the women themselves to
investigate whether the investment was a priority for them,
5 Only one program, the NCWD, subsidized the price of the
equipment, but it is only a partial subsidy.
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whether the technology was in fact an improvement and, thus,
whether the investment was worthwhile. Although far from
foolproof, this system put pressure on the development
agencies to provide useful technology.
2) No Continuous Subsidies: These better-performing
agencies also exerted pressure on the projects to perform
well by only loaning the groups start-up capital, and not
providing ongoing capital. Even in many programs that do
not plan on providing continuous assistance to groups,
typically, if a group business begins to fail, agencies prop
up the project by injecting additional capital, repairing
the machine for free, or otherwise rescuing the situation.
Many development agencies do this because they want to keep
benefits flowing to their beneficiaries, or because the
project collapse will spoil the agency's reputation. But
the effect is often to subsidize mis-management and/or poor
project design.
In contrast, the programs in this study provided
capital equipment at the start of the projects, but the only
continuing assistance was technical and management advice.
If machines broke down, if the business wasn't making money,
if women were refusing to pay for services, then the group
had to sort the problem out, which they often did with
arbitration from the program staff. Knowing that the
program staff could not put additional money into the
project, even if they wanted to, legitimate leaders were
under pressure to manage the business well. Even corrupt
leaders had an incentive to keep the machines operating. If
the machines broke down, the agencies would not fix them and
the leaders would lose their source of revenue. The
effectiveness of these performance pressures depended, in
part, on good feasibility studies at the beginning of the
project. Otherwise, many projects would simply have failed
in the face of these external pressures to perform. But
there were also internal mechanisms that enabled these
groups to survive in this sink-or-swim environment.
4.13 Internal Mechanisms
Some groups were able to manage the improved technology
themselves because they were well run groups in three
ways.' The best 'example was the Africa Housing Fund (AHF)
project in Kenya. 1) One precondition for successful
collective action is a socially cohesive group with a
common, high priority interest (Ostrom 1990, Wade 1986,
Attwood & Bavistar 1987). The women in the AHF project were
of the same ethnic group living in a fairly homogenous rural
community, in terms of class. They shared the common, severe
problem of short water supply in their semi-arid region.
This common problem brought the women together, and they
were not divided by ethnic, class or political differences.
C Because this study did not collect information from large
numbers of women's groups, I cannot be sure how many
groups fit this description.
2) A second common element of successful group action
is a democratic control structure and, sometimes, an outside
arbitrator to settle disputes (Ostrom 1990). The AHF
project brought together 12 rural women's groups into one
association, the Muungano Women's Group, whose members
elected a management committee made up of a chairwoman,
secretary, and treasurer. The bulk of the decisions about
the project were made by eight committees with elected
representatives from each of the 12 groups. Some of the
committees, such as the income-generating committee and the
farming committee, were formed when members wanted
assistance with specific issues, like raising money and
increasing their agricultural productivity to be able to pay
off their loans. This participatory structure in turn
depended on AHF staff to settle occasional disputes. Though
the AHF staff said they are trying to withdraw from playing
this role, many groups go to some kind of external agent,
government or community leaders, to settle disputes (Ostrom
1990). The daily operations and decision, though, were
made by the Muungano Women's group.
3) Finally, most collective organizations have
established clear incentives, rewards, and sanctions (Ostrom
1990). For example, Muungano Women's Group owned four
factories that produced building materials and sold them to
individual women at cost. The factories required 45 full-
time workers and produced year-round. For this type of
full-time work, the project paid a salary to the hired
members. Though this may not seem unusual, many women's
projects expect women to volunteer their time, often without
clear rewards for the women concerned. For example, small
women's groups often build collective water sources, such as
small earthen dams, which are then used by the entire
community. Or, women often spend one or two days a week at
a group factory without receiving wages, knowing only that
at a later date the profits should appear in the group bank
account.
The AHF project also required women to volunteer labor,
but the contribution was limited, had immediate rewards, and
women were sanctioned if they do not comply. For example,
women formed groups of five with their close neighbors who
then built each others' houses. The women built houses
during the non-farming season, and in a two-year period they
were expected to build five, two-room houses with a water
tank. The requirement was fixed, limited, convenient, and
each woman helped only those women that help her. If one
women refused to help her neighbors, they would not help her
to build her house. In this way, women faced serious
consequences if they did not provide the necessary labor.
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4.2 Wider Adoption by Individual Women
In two other cases in this study, the fuel-efficient
stoves and the improved fish ovens, the agencies used a
dissemination strategy that resulted in the equipment being
permanently available on the open market and being bought
directly by individual women. In other words, most of the
women who adopted that technology purchased the stoves and
ovens without assistance from the development agencies. In
Chorker, a major fishing village near Accra, Ghana, the NCWD
established fewer than five demonstration projects of
improved fish ovens, all of which were adopted. As a
result, other fish smokers in the village were impressed
with the performance of the improved ovens, and several
years later every fish smoker in the village had hired local
builders to make them improved ovens. In five districts in
Kenya, in a period of four years, over 30,000 women have
adopted a fuel-efficient stove, and less than one in 30 of
these stoves were built as demonstration projects.
These results were different from the results of both
the "extension" programs, which so far have failed to
achieve widespread technology adoption, and the "market-
style" programs, which so far have resulted in widespread
adoption by men, not women. The strategy described here
reached women because of the need and technology
identification processes described above. This section
describes how the development agencies trained manufacturers
and established commercial distribution systems so that
women could independently purchase the fish ovens and stoves
without relying on the agencies to supply them.
When the NCWD demonstrated the improved fish ovens in
Chorker, they trained village artisans who made the
traditional fish ovens to make the mud firebox of the
improved ovens. In addition, they trained village
carpenters to make the fish trays, which stack on top of the
firebox to complete the oven. Once the demonstration ovens
proved successful, the women bought them at their full
price, and from then on other women purchased them directly
from the artisans.
In the case of the fuel-efficient stove, the Ministry
of Energy in Kenya also trained local manufacturers. In
addition, it had to ensure stove distribution.
Manufacturers of the fish ovens make the ovens for women in
the village wherever the women smoke fish, and both the oven
makers and the carpenters live in the same village. With
the fuel-efficient stoves, the women purchase a clay liner,
which forms the firebox, and then build the body of the
stove themselves. Only the clay liners are manufactured by
firms. Manufacturing the liners requires fairly extensive
training to ensure good quality liners of a standard shape
that will not crack. For this reason, the Ministry of
Energy only trained one or two producers in each district,
who could supply liners for a whole district. The Ministry
then had to figure out a way of distributing the liners, as
explained below, to large numbers of women living in remote
rural areas.
Working with clay is considered women's work in most
parts of Kenya and the Ministry felt that liner production
would generate extra benefits for women. The Ministry
therefore originally identified and trained women's groups
to produce the clay liners cooperatively. Because of the
many problems that typically plague women's groups, most of
the women's groups did not produce the clay liners well.
When a district-level staff member identified a male
entrepreneur who was already experimenting with innovative
clay products, the Ministry approached him, trained him to
make the liners, and he is now the most reliable liner
producer in East and Central Kenya. The most reliable
producer in Western Kenya, however, is a women's group that
received substantial management assistance from another
development agency. Though the Ministry did not have the
capacity to work closely with women's groups to help them
produce the liners better, the Ministry's flexible approach
allowed it to work with whoever could get the job done,
whether a women's group receiving outside assistance or a
male entrepreneur.
This flexible approach also brought forth an effective
distribution system. When the Ministry of Energy began
disseminating the stove in each district, it held an
awareness raising workshop open to staff from a wide variety
of ministries, local goverr--.ts, and non-governmental
development agencies. Sta. .-rom these various, and
sometimes competing, agencies then came to the Ministry of
Energy's training of trainers sessions to learn how to make
stoves and set up demonstration projects. These agencies
experimented with different ways to distribute the stove,
until, eventually, a private sector mechanism emerged that
seemed to work best.
For example, in Murang'a District in Central Kenya,
volunteers from Maendeleo ya Wanawake were the first people
to demonstrate the stoves and distribute the liners, but
they lost interest in time because there was little
financial reward for the work. The Ministry of Agriculture
then became active through its agricultural extension
agents, who demonstrated the stoves to women's group and
contact farmers. They then distributed liners, using
Ministry of Agriculture vehicles, directly to women who
wanted to make stoves. Soon, however, the demand for liners
was higher than the amount the Ministry's could transport.
To fill the gap, several women's groups went into business
building stoves for women in the community and became an
outlet for the Ministry to deliver larger numbers of liners
to one place. Building on this experience, Ministry of
Agriculture staff began identifying traders in market
centers or villages who were interested in "stocking" the
liners, and selling them at a profit. Finally, the Ministry
introduced these groups and traders (distributors) to the
manufacturer of the clay liners, a male entrepreneur. Now,
the distributors keep track of how many women need liners,
they place orders with the manufacturer and he delivers
liners to the distributors in a truck he rents himself. The
final production and distribution system, then, ultimately
requires no ongoing assistance from the Ministry of Energy
or any other development agency.
4.3 Dissemination Strategies & Characteristics of the
Technology
Neither of the two technology-dissemination strategies
used by the better-performing agencies inherently worked
better than the other. Rather, the characteristics of the
different technologies led to these two different
dissemination strategies. These characteristics fall into
three categories: affordability, technical complexity, and
scale.
1) Affordability: The stoves and ovens were affordable
to individual women, whereas the other implements in this
study were not. As a result, the agencies disseminating the
more expensive technologies had to provide financing
directly to women, and the agencies disseminating the
cheaper technologies did not.
TABLE 5: PRICE OF IMPROVED IMPLEMENTS IN RURAL WAGES7
Maendeleo Stove 1 chicken, or 2 days of rural wages
Improved Fish Oven 2 times price of traditional oven
House & Water Tank 3 years of rural wages
Maize Mill 10 years of rural wages
Due to the high inflation rapidly devaluing currency in
Ghana since the technologies were adopted, I could not
estimate "wage-prices" for the palm oil equipment or the
fish ovens.
"Affordability" is difficult to compare across
countries so Table 5 expresses the price of the implements
in terms of the prevailing rural wage. The fuel-efficient
stove, which represents only two days' labor, is much more
affordable than the house and water tank, which costs three
years worth of rural wages, and the maize mill which costs,
ten years of rural wages.
2) Technical Level: The skills required to use and
maintain the stoves and improved ovens are familiar skills
to women who adopt these technologies. Both are used in the
same way as traditional stoves and ovens, and the primary
maintenance task is smearing mud over cracks as they
develop. This is how women repair the traditional fish oven
and how women in Kenya repair the mud walls and floors of
their houses. Women could easily watch a neighbor using the
oven or stove and copy them. These technologies differ from
the mechanized technologies in this study, which require
women to learn new skills. In order to adopt the more
complex technologies, women had to attend training courses
that lasted two weeks and were only available from the
development agencies.
3) Scale: Finally, when disseminating larger scale
technologies, the development agencies insisted that women
adopt the technology in groups. Table 6 shows the increase
in scale that the improved technologies represent over the
existing traditional technologies -- represented as the
56
factor increase in the amount of raw material processed per
hour with the switch from the old processing method to the
new equipment.
Women could adopt the fish ovens and stoves without
increasing their scale of production. In these cases, the
motive for adopting was that the improved stove and fish
oven saved enough wood to make the investment worthwhile,
and both also cooked slightly faster than traditional
methods. Women also adopted the fish oven because the fish
smoked in the improved oven was of better quality and could
fetch a higher price. If a women wanted to increase her
scale of production with the fish oven, however, she could
do so incrementally. An improved oven with four trays holds
the same amount of fish as the traditional oven, but at its
full capacity of 20 trays, the improved fish oven increases
scale by a factor of 5, more than the improved palm-oil
equipment (3.25). The maize mills and palm-oil equipment,
in contrast, are not divisible and represent an immediate,
large increase over women's individual scale of production,
from a factor of 3.25 to 785.
These physical differences in the technologies explain
the corresponding different disseminations strategies.
Though the dissemination strategy used with the ovens and
stoves made the technologies permanently available to large
numbers of women, this strategy would not have worked with
the other technologies in the study that, nevertheless
benefitted large numbers of women. The other three
technologies required financing, training and larger scale
production, which led agencies to help women's groups.
These observations illustrate the interdependence of
dissemination strategies and technology characteristics.
TABLE 6: INCREASED CAPACITY OF IMPROVED TECHNOLOGIES
TRADITIONAL IMPROVED FACTOR
TECHNOLOGY TECHNOLOGY INCREASE IN
INPUT/TIME
Fuel Same output, uses
Efficient 30-50% less fuel 0
Stoves
Fish 60 Kgs. 60-300 Kgs.
Ovens: Fish/day Fish/batch 0-5
(depends on the Times more
number of trays) fish/hour.
Palm Oil: 50 Kgs. 163 Kgs. 3.25
of nuts/hr of nuts/hr Times more
nuts/hour.
Maize 2 Kgs. 115-145, 1100-1570 57-72,
Mills Maize/hr Kgs. Maize/hr 520-785
(depends on size & Times more
engine horsepower) maize/hour
SECTION FIVE: REACHING THE POOR
A final issue that concerns many development agencies
is whether the use of improved technology helps better-off
or poor women. Some literature on women and technology
development claims that improved technology is generally
labor displacing and therefore bad for the poor (Ahmed 1985,
Dauber and Cain 1988, D'Onoflores and Pflafflin 1988). For
example, when mechanized rice threshers were introduced in
Malaysia, the women who used to thresh rice by hand lost
their livelihoods because the machines threshed rice faster
and cheaper than they could. Male farmers were given credit
and training to adopt the threshers, and the women could not
afford to buy them on their own (Hart 1990).
The normal strategy that development agencies use to
avoid this negative distributional impact is to introduce
the technology to groups of poor women, rather than to
individual men. For example, if a development agency
donated the mechanized rice thresher to the same women that
used to thresh rice by hand, then the machines would
increase productivity without displacing the women (Dauber
and Cain 1988). Donating improved equipment, however, is
expensive and forming women's groups is often time
consuming. As a result, programs donating improved
equipment to women's groups often do not assist large
numbers of women. This experience has led some writers to
consider disseminating technology to individual women, but
this literature predicts that only middle income women would
benefit from individual adoption patterns (Carr 1989,
Schoonmaker 1988). Many development agencies therefore
continue to see improved technology as inherently
detrimental to poor women, and therefore assume that working
with women only in groups is the best strategy. This
assumption bears questioning.
The cases reviewed and some literature on women's
groups in Africa, suggest that women's groups do not
necessarily comprise the poorest women, primarily because
women have to pay dues in order to join (Sorensen 1990,
Stamp 1989). For example, while most women in Kenya are
involved in some kind of women's groups, poor women tend to
belong to older forms of neighbor-based groups in which
members simply assist each other with household tasks during
peak harvest seasons, emergencies and celebrations. In
contrast, the registered, dues-paying groups that engaged in
income-earning projects are usually made up of better-off
women in the area, rather than neighbors (Sorensen 1990,
Stamp 1989). According to program staff, the women in the
groups they worked with did represent a somewhat better-off
income group.
The evidence reported here also questions the
assumption that improved technology is inherently labor
displacing because four of the five improved technologies
reviewed did not displace women's paid labor. The fuel-
efficient stove helped reduce the time women spent
collecting wood, which was unpaid labor. Similarly, water
tanks reduced women's unpaid labor in carrying water, and,
in addition, the building-materials factories created
employment. Also, the maize mills reduced the time and
arduousness of manual grinding, which was also unpaid labor.
Finally, the fish ovens reduced the arduousness of fish
smoking and the time it took to smoke fish, while at the
same time not reducing the number of employees a fish monger
needs. These technologies, then, did not threaten poor
women's livelihoods. There was one exception: palm oil
processing. When owned by individuals, the improved
equipment does threaten small scale women producers. As the
literature predicts, however, this did not happen when the
equipment was owned by groups of oil producers.
What, then, was the distributional impact of the
technologies in this study and what forces led to that
outcome ? Unfortunately, the agencies in this study either
did not have or did not make available, income data about
their beneficiaries, either before or after the program. It
is therefore not possible to make conclusive statements
about whether these technologies helped poor or middle
income women. We can, nevertheless, make several
observations about aspects of the programs that tended to
make the technologies benefit different income groups.
The use of feasibility studies to select viable
locations and well-organized groups improved the financial
viability of the projects, but it also tended to benefit
better-off women. A "viable" location in these cases was
one where women could afford to pay for maize milling
services, or a productive areas where palm nut supply was
high enough. to merit investment in larger scale oil
processing equipment. By selecting these locations, the
agencies in this study "weeded-out" poorer women located in
lower-income or less productive areas, where women
nevertheless spend long hours milling maize and processing
palm-oil by hand. In addition, the agencies judged the
organizational capability of a group based on its successful
past endeavors and the size of its bank account. Selecting
such groups meant excluding poorer groups.
Other aspects of these programs, however, tended to
benefit poorer women. 1) Though all of the agencies in this
study selected the cheapest technology available, in two
cases, the agencies were able to select technology that was
affordable to individual women. These women were not
better-off women. Women who were too poor to join official
women's group were nevertheless able to afford the fuel-
efficient stove. And, most women in Chorker village who
previously owned a fish oven were able to invest in the
improved ovens.
2) In the other three cases - palm-oil processing,
building housing and water tanks, and maize milling - the
agencies and the women made the technology more affordable,
in time and money, through a) credit, subsidies and user
fees, and b) structuring the projects to fit women's
schedules. Though these practices did not ensure that the
poor benefitted, they helped a poorer stratum of women to
benefit than would have been possible without these
mechanisms.
a) With the palm-oil equipment, the building-materials
equipment and the maize mills, the women and the agencies
came up with financial mechanisms that helped women adopt
the technologies. The NCWD only charged women one third the
actual price of the palm-oil equipment," and they loaned
the women the other third, using the machinery itself as
collateral and giving the women a two-year payback period.
To cover the cost of working capital, the women charged a
fee for individual users. ENDA also provided five-year
loans for the maize mills in Zimbabwe, using the mills as
collateral, and the women's groups also charged user fees.
The AHF financed the building-materials equipment and
the women's houses. The group repaid the loans for the
factories over five years as individual women purchased
materials for their houses and water tanks (with loans from
8 Note that this partial subsidy is still different from a
100% donation that characterizes more typical progra.s.
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AHF). The individual women repaid their loans on different
schedules according to the income they earned. For example,
women who received remittances from relatives working in
urban areas could choose to pay monthly, while women who
survive on farm income could pay seasonally. Since the
women did not hold the title to their land, the loans had no
collateral. To encourage repayment, then, the women in the
AHF project formed small loan groups. Unless current
borrowers in the groups were paying regularly, other members
of the group could not receive new loans.
b) In addition, in these three programs, the agencies
and the women designed projects to fit the use of the
technology into women's existing labor patterns as much as
possible. For example, the small groups of women that build
each others' houses in the AHF project could arrange to do
this work whenever they could more easily spare the time.
Similarly, individual women could use the palm-oil equipment
and the maize mills when it was convenient for them. The
structure of these projects contrasts with many rural
women's income-generating projects, which often fail because
the women are too busy working on their farms to put extra
time into new work, particularly if they are expected to
volunteer their time.
3) When the projects needed women to work continuously
at the building-materials, stove liner, and palm-oil
factories, the women's groups paid wages, and poor women
tended to take those jobs. Mature, married women, for the
most part, had land to farm and were too busy for full-time
wage labor. Most of the women working full-time, then, were
young, landless, single mothers who did not face the same
labor constraints as women farmers did, and who were some of
the poorest women in the community.
4) Finally, two technologies in these projects
benefitted a broader range of women because they allowed
those outside the group to use their equipment for a fee.
Though the palm-oil equipment was owned by selected groups
of women, non-members living near the factories could bring
their palm nuts to be processed there. Individual women
normally process small quantities of palm oil manually,
keeping some for the family and selling the rest. Having
access to the irbproved equipment for a fee, then, reduced
the time women spent processing their palm oil and allowed
them to increase their production. Similarly, each maize
mill was owned by only five to ten women, but several
hundred women brought their maize to be milled by each
mechanized machine. For women who previously used further
away mills, the new mills reduced the distance they had to
walk; and for women who used to process maize by hand, the
new mills reduced grinding time from five hours to five
minutes. In both these cases, then, poorer women outside
the official women's groups benefitted from access to the
improved technology, though they did not own it.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study examined five better-performing programs
that assisted women to adopt and benefit from improved
technology. Various features of these cases shed light on
five issues that agencies face when designing and
implementing women's technology programs: 1) institutional
design, 2) technology development and selection, 3) gender
issues 4) technology dissemination strategies, and 5)
reaching the poor. The findings suggest different ways of
thinking about these issues, and illustrate ways these
better-performing agencies were able to reach larger numbers
of women than most women's technology programs do.
1) Institutional Design
Some literature on women's technology programs
attribute success to the type of implementing institution,
but this issue remains unresolved. Government agencies have
a broad impact, but NGOs have a reputation for being
responsive and working well with particular target groups.
Mainstream development agencies that work with both men and
women do not have a good track record at targeting women,
but the alternative - women's organizations - tend to be
technically weak and highly political. The better-
performing agencies in this study, however, represented all
four types of institutions. In contrast to prevailing
wisdom, whether the implementing agencies were government
agencies or NGOS, a mainstream development agency or a
women's organization, was not a key factor in the.ability of
the implementing agencies to quickly reach large numbers of
women.
All these different types of agencies worked
efficiently because they benefitted from existing networks
of women's groups. These networks served as invaluable
contact points for identifying women's needs and for
publicizing the programs. This finding was surprising,
given the clientelist and political tendencies that
characterize these women's networks. It seemed that these
political tendencies were balanced, in these cases, by the
strong business orientation and technical capacity of the
implementing agencies.
2) Technology Design Process
Practitioners and writers about technology development
have reached a virtual consensus that in order for
technology to be appropriate for women or men, it must be
developed in conjunction with potential users, rather than
in "isolated" technical institutes. This study found,
however, that such interaction was not always an ingredient
of success. Interaction with potential beneficiaries was
significant, however, in identifying women's needs and
selecting technology. The agencies conducted studies of
specific sectors and consulted women to identify their major
activities and constraints. In four cases, the agencies
identified an existing technology that met women's needs,
rather than developing new technology. This facilitated
fast program implementation because the agencies' main task
was to assist women to obtain the equipment and provide
training. A technology was not available in the case of the
fuel-efficient stove, so the agency had to spend three years
developing the technology before disseminating the stove.
This technology benefitted the most women, but took three
years longer than the other programs.
3) Gender Issues
A third issue about women and technology concerns
women's willingness to adopt improved technology in relation
to their culturally defined gender roles. Some feminist
literature suggests that women have the most to gain by
entering male-dominated sectors, like carpentry or
metalwork. But, most Appropriate Technology and WID
literature suggests that women will not adopt technology
that requires work usually performed by men. In several
cases in this study, however, women stepped outside their
gender roles in order to adopt improved technology. Though
the technologies addressed women's problems, such as water
delivery, the solutions required tasks that are normally
considered men's work, like masonry. The agencies sometimes
provided technical training and encouraged women to do this
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"men's" work. Sometimes, though, women hired men - that is,
to operate mechanized equipment, keep financial records,
perform full-time wage labor, or manager the enterprise.
Both parties, surprisingly, adjusted to the idea of men
working for women. This finding suggests that developing
technology that precisely fits existing gender divisions of
labor may be less important than identifying women's
priority needs and providing training and encouragement that
enables women to adopt technology.
4) Technology Dissemination Strategies
A final concern of agencies trying to reach women with
improved technology is choosing an effective dissemination
strategy. Most agencies have used what the literature calls
the "extension" route in which the development agency
procures and donates equipment and provides training to
selected women's groups. This contrasts with the so-called
"market" approach in which agencies train manufacturing
firms to produce the equipment; the latter then sell the
equipment on the private market. Actually, neither of the
approaches has so far reached many women. Though the
"market" programs are better at achieving widespread
technology adoption, they tend to benefit middle income,
male entrepreneurs. Though the "extension" programs do work
with women, many of the women's groups they assist rely on
the agencies for subsidies, have trouble maintaining the
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equipment, or are otherwise mismanaged to the point that
women eventually abandon the machines.
The agencies in this study did not use one or the other
strategy. Rather, they used elements of each in two ways, 1)
one that worked with women's groups, and 2) one that worked
with individuals and resulted in widespread adoption in the
private sector. Neither combination was inherently more
successful. Though the approach that worked with
individuals led to wider patterns of technology adoption,
working with groups was necessary in some cases in order for
women to benefit at all due to the physical characteristics
of the technology.
4.1 Strategy 1: Working with Women's Groups
Three agencies in the study introduced technology to
women's groups but, unlike more typical programs, the groups
managed the equipment well without being dependent on the
agency. Three components of the programs encouraged this
positive outcome:
1) The development agencies carried out micro-level
feasibility studies to select experienced, well-organized
groups and viable locations where there was adequate supply
of raw materials and adequate markets for finished products.
This contrasts with more typical women's technology programs
in which development agencies donate equipment to the
neediest or the most politically connected women's groups.
2) The better-performing agencies provided financing
and continuous advice, but did not donate equipment and did
not provide continuous subsidies to the women's group
projects. Many other agencies donate equipment that women
do not use, but the fact that women in these programs had to
pay for the.improved equipment led women to play a more
active role in technology selection. In less successful
programs, if a business performs poorly, the development
agencies often rush in with emergency grants or repair
services. The lack of ongoing subsidies in the more
successful programs pressured the women's group members to
hold their leaders accountable for the performance of the
business. The effective use of these performance pressures,
in turn, depended on good feasibility studies.
3) Some of'the groups were well managed. They a) were
a socially cohesive group with a common, high priority
interest, b) had a democratic control structure, and c)
established clear incentives, rewards, and sanctions.
4.2 Strategy 2: Working with Individuals
With respect to the fuel-efficient stove and the
improved fish oven, the technologies were widely adopted by
individual women for two reasons. 1) In contrast to the
"market" style-programs, these two agencies surveyed women's
groups to identify women's needs and to select the
technology, and they carried out demonstration projects with
women's groups. 2) To disseminate the technology further,
the agencies (a) trained manufacturers and/or, (b)
established commercial distribution of the stoves and ovens
so that large numbers of women could purchase them without
needing to rely on the development agency.
4.3 Dissemination Strategies & Characteristics of the
Technology
The two dissemination strategies that worked best in
these cases were intricately connected to the physical
characteristics of the technology. Three technologies
required financing, training of women, and large scale
production: this was only possible if women formed groups.
The technologies adopted by individual women through market
channels were affordable, in turn, without financing;
required no training, since women were familiar with the
necessary operation and maintenance skills; and did not
require a costly and difficult increase in scale of
production.
5) Reaching the Poor
Finally, many development agencies are concerned about
whether improved technology programs benefit better-off or
poor women. Based on the data collected, it was difficult
to tell the income stratum of the women benefitting from
these projects, but several observations are possible. On
the one hand, the use of feasibility studies to select
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viable projects inadvertently benefitted better-off women,
because they weeded out lower-income areas where women could
not afford to pay for services and lower income groups who
did not have enough savings to qualify. On the other hand,
four things contributed to these projects helping less well-
off women: 1) selecting technology that was affordable for
individual women, 2) financing and designing the projects to
fit women's labor constraints, 3) providing full-time wage
labor to landless women, and 4) allowing non-members to use
the improved equipment for a fee.
This study examined five better-performing women's
technology programs. The findings suggest that assisting
women to adopt and benefit from improved technology may not
be as difficult as the literature implies. The different
types of agencies in this study took advantage of prior work
carried out by women's networks and technology development
agencies to facilitate program implementation. In addition,
they took a flexible approach toward technology development
process and dissemination strategy, which contributed to
program effectiveness. Finally, the agencies enabled the
women themselves to play an active role in technology
selection, project management, and even dissemination, which
ultimately helped the programs respond to women's needs and
spread the benefits beyond the demonstration projects.
APPENDIX I: CASES
IMPROVED HOUSING & WATER CATCHMENT TANKS:
KENYA, Africa Housing Fund
Description
Muungano Women's group, a new association of 12
existing rural women's groups in Eastern Kenya, owns and
operates four building materials factories. In small groups
of five neighbors, members build each others' houses and '
rain-catchment water tanks'with the building materials which
they buy at cost from the factories. The small groups
guarantee each others' loans from the Africa Housing Fund.
45 of these women also work full time in the factories.
Africa Housing Fund also manages 10 other similar projects
in East Africa.
The building materials - fibre-concrete roofing tiles
and hollow concrete blocks - are shaped in metal molds and
vibrated with a small engine that runs off a car battery.
The vibration adds strength so that the tiles and blocks
require less cement and cost less than normal cement blocks
and tiles.
Previous Technology
Depending on the season, the women previously walked
between three and 15 kilometers to use community water
sources such as rock catchments and dry river beds. They
previously lived in mud houses with thatch or tin roofs.
BENE- 900 members of 12 rural women's groups in a
FICIARIES semi-arid region of Kenya.
COST The house with water tank costs three years
worth of rural wages.
BENEFITS The women now have water at their houses for
four to six months out of the year, depending
on the rains, and they now live in cement
houses with tile roofs. The women that work
in the factory have increased income.
TIME TO The building materials equipment breaks even
BREAK EVEN in two years.
FINANCING Africa Housing Fund gave loans to individual
women for their houses, and to the women's
group for the building materials equipment.
(See Picture, next page)
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FUEL EFFICIENT STOVE: Kenya, Ministry of Energy
Description
A wood saving stove consisting of a factory produced
clay liner and a mud and stone body which women make
themselves. GTZ funded the research and development of the
stove which was carried out within Maendeleo ya Wanawake,
the national women's organization. This case focuses on the
national dissemination campaign that the Ministry of Energy
launched, also with GTZ funding.
Previous Technology: Three stone fire.
BENEFICIARIES 30,000 individual, rural women in five
districts of Kenya.
COST The liner costs the price of a chicken, or
two days' worth of rural wages.
BENEFITS9  The improved stove uses 30-50 % less wood,
so women who adopt the stove save time
normally spent collecting wood.
TIME TO BREAK In areas where women pay for fuel, they
EVEN recover the cost of the stove in savings
after around one month.
FINANCING The program only provides financing for
the liner production factories.
(See Picture, next page)
In this and other cases, this study could not assess the
exact amount of time women save nor how they use that
time.
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Fuel-Efficient Stove
1
Improved Fish Oven
ft
V,
IMPROVED FISH OVEN: GHANA, NCWD
Previous Technology
The ovens are owned by senior women in a family who
employ three to five daughters or sisters. The traditional
fish oven has a round mud body with a built-in wire tray.
During the smoking process, women remove the fish several
times, shuffling them around in order to smoke them evenly.
Improved Ovens
The improved oven for smoking fish consists of a
rectangular mud firebox with 5-20 removable wire mesh trays
stacked above it. It's capacity is five times that of the
traditional oven. With this oven the women shuffle the
trays of fish. The reduced handling lightens the workload
and produces higher quality, higher priced fish.
(See Picture, previous page)
BENE- 845-1950: 200-300 women owners in Choker, 15-
FICIARIES 30 women owners in three other fishing
villages, and 645-1650 employees.
COST The improved oven, with 20 trays, costs three
times as much as the traditional oven.
BENEFITS The new oven saves labor and increases income,
for both the oven owners and their employees.
FINANCING In Choker, the NCWD did not provide any
financing. In the other villages, they
subsidized the oven price by one third.
PALM OIL PROCESSING: GHANA, NCWD
Description
Women remove palm nuts from bunches by hand. They boil
the nuts in large tanks that sit over slightly enclosed wood
fires. Then women pour the boiled nuts into mechanized
"digesters" that remove the fiber from the nut. Women then
press the red palm oil from this mixture using a manual
screw press. Though the equipment is owned by a group,
individual women can also use the equipment for a fee.
Previous Technology
Women also remove the nuts by hand and then boil them
in smaller pots over three stone fires. They pour the
mixture into earth pits dug into the ground and remove the
fiber from the nut by stomping with their feet. Then they
remove the fibre and palm kernels with baskets and finally
remove the palm oil with gourds.
BENE- 3,000: 1500 members of 50 rural women's
FICIARIES groups. Each group owns a set of palm oil
processing equipment. An additional 30 women
use each set of equipment for a fee.
COST Due to high inflation and the dual currency
market, the cost at different times over the
four year period is difficult to estimate.
BENEFITS The time to process oil is reduced by two
thirds. Women also save some fuel and get a
slightly higher extraction rate from their
palm nuts. Women that own the equipment
increase their income.
TIME TO 2 years.
BREAK EVEN
FINANCING NCWD provides loans to the women's groups for
the equipment and subsidizes the cost of
equipment by one third.
(See Picture, next page)
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MECHANIZED MAIZE MILLS: ZIMBABWE, ENDA
Description
Diesel powered mechanized maize mills for grinding
maize into flour, which women use for cooking the staple
food in Zimbabwe.
Previous Technology
Some women grind their maize manually, with a mortar
and pestle. Others walk up to 8 kilometers to use other
mills.
BENE- 600-900 women living near rural trading
FICIARIES centers, who use the mills for a fee, and 20
members of three better-off women's groups
that each own one mill in a rural trading
center.
COST The mills cost 10 years' worth of rural
wages.
BENEFITS Mechanized mills reduce grinding time from
several hours to several minutes. For women
who already used a mill, this one is simply
closer so women spend less time and energy
walking to the mills. The women who own the
mills increased their income.
TIME TO Within five years.
BREAK EVEN
FINANCING ENDA financed the purchase of the Maize Mill,
but the women's groups built the shed and
supplied the working capital.
LIST OF AGENCIES CONSULTED
USA
Appropriate Technology International
Jeane Downing
1331 H St. NW - Washington, DC - 20005 - USA
FAX: 202-628-4622
International Development Enterprises
Paul Pollak
1901 Kipling St., Suite 24 - Lakewood, CO - 80215 - USA
UNIFEM
Marilyn Carr
304 East 45th ST, 6th Floor / NY, NY 10017
FAX:212-906-6705 TEL: 212-906-6400
Technoserve
Peter Reiling and James Herne
49 Day St. - Norwalk, CT - 06954 - USA
KENYA
Africa Housing Fund
Ms.Ingrid Munroe
PO Box 41479 - Nairobi, Kenya
Tel: 722-305 FAX: 722024
Ministry of Energy: GTZ/Special Energy Project
Mrs. Chavangi
PO Box 41607 - Nairobi, Kenya
Tel: 561512 FAX: 567086
Technoserve - Kenya
John Makilya
PO Box 14821 - Nairobi, Kenya
TEL: 743-628
ApproTEC
Dr. Martin Fisher
PO Box 42814 Nairobi, Kenya
Tel: 799989, 799993, 751524
Nancy Wilson, Ford Foundation
Silo Park House, Nairobi
Tel: 338123
Jennifer Sepstadt,
Consultant on Small Enterprise Development
Nairobi, Tel: 582-823
ZIMBABWE
UNIFEM
Jo Doran
PO Box 4775 Harare
Tel: 704729
ENDA
Joshua Gwitira, Arthur Chaguma and Tsitsi Dzumbera
PO Box 3492 Harare
Tel:708568
Intermediate Technology Development Group
Noma Mposu, Steve Chapika and Ishmael Sunga
PO Box 1744 Harare
Tel: 796409, 796420
World University Service of Canada
Zimbabwe Oil Press Project
Peter Jones
PO Box 647 Marondera
Tel: 179 340017 or 4698
Institute of Agricultural Engineering - Ministry of
Agriculture
Raymond Nazare
PO Box BW 330 Borrowdale, Harare
Tel:725-342, 725-936
Development Technology Center - University of Zimbabwe
Dr. Jeremy Ascough, Director
PO Box 167 Harare, Zimbabwe
Tel: 303211 ext:1664
Rural Women's Training Unit - Ministry of Political Affairs
Lilian Kamanga Tel: RUWA 173 2296
Ranch House College, Bertha Msora
PO Box 1881, Harare
Tel: 702201, 702-198
GHANA
GRATIS
(Ghana Regional Appropriate Technology Industrial Service)
Dr. K. Prakah-Asante, Director
Yvonne Wallace-Bruce, Rural & Women's Indistry Division
Dr.John Powell, Technical Advisor
Robert Buatsi, Head, Socio-Economic & Communications Unit
PO Box 151 Tema, Ghana
Tel:Tema, 4243
Technology Consultancy Center & ITTU Kumasi
Peter Donkor
University of Science & Engineering
FAX: 51-3534
Kumasi, Ghana
National Council of Women & Development
ILO/Netherlands project
Mrs. Koti (& Francis Winnow-Hagen)
Accra, Ghana
Technoserve
Paul Warmka
PO Box 135 Accra, Ghana
TEL: 775-651
Nkuleno Industries
Dr. Mrs. Esther Ocloo, Managing Director
PO Box 36 Legion, Accra Ghana
TEL: 77923
NIGERIA
Technoserve
Meg Bowman and Dr. Charles Akinola
PO Box 74596 Victoria Island
Lagos Nigeria
Tel: 635-868, 630-692 FAX: 611-195
Telex: 23311 FORWAN NG
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